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Abstract An essential element in the smart city vision is providing safe and
secure journeys via intelligent vehicles and smart roads. Vehicular ad hoc net-
works (VANETs) have played a significant role in enhancing road safety where
vehicles can share road information conditions. However, VANETs share the
same security concerns of legacy ad hoc networks. Unlike exiting works, we
consider, in this paper, detection a common attack where nodes modify safety
message or drop them. Unfortunately, detecting such a type of intrusion is
a challenging problem since some packets may be lost or dropped in normal
VANET due to congestion without malicious action. To mitigate these con-
cerns, this paper presents a novel scheme for minimizing the invalidity ratio
of VANET packets transmissions. In order to detect unusual traffic, the pro-
posed scheme combines evidences from current as well as past behaviour to
evaluate the trustworthiness of both data and nodes. A new intrusion detec-
tion scheme is accomplished through a four phases, namely, rule-based security
filter, Dempster–Shafer adder, node’s history database, and Bayesian learner.
The suspicion level of each incoming data is determined based on the extent of
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its deviation from data reported from trustworthy nodes. Dempster–Shafer’s
theory is used to combine multiple evidences and Bayesian learner is adopted
to classify each event in VANET into well-behaved or misbehaving event. The
proposed solution is validated through extensive simulations. The results con-
firm that the fusion of different evidences has a significant positive impact on
the performance of the security scheme compared to other counterparts.
Keyword: intrusion detection; smart city; malicious nodes; security; mis-
behavior detection.
1 Introduction
Recently, VANETs are adopted to significantly reduce traffic accidents, en-
hance road safety and traffic congestion, and to improve the driving experi-
ence. In order to increase drivers’ awareness, smart vehicles cooperate to relay
safety messages and road condition to other vehicles and roadside units (RSU)
[23,20,5,6,12,2]. However, VANETs have security concerns since information
is transmitted via open space environment without any central support. In
this environment, malicious node can join a network at any time and inject
false messages wirelessly[12]. Unsecured nodes can expect to maliciously ma-
nipulating the stream of packets. For enhancing safety, malicious nodes should
be prevented from changing safety messages. In VANET, source and destina-
tion nodes which are not in the same range relay on intermediate nodes for
forwarding messages to the final destination. It would be an excellent oppor-
tunity to interpose on the traffic stream and manipulate it maliciously if a
malicious node has been selected as a relay node. Therefore, the reliability of
the VANET depends upon the intermediate nodes.
For safety application in VANET, timely and accurate information rep-
resents the backbone of information security. The accuracy factor represents
the ability of VANET to deliver the state of road and traffic correctly and
timely. Failure of safety message delivery could impose a human life threat.
However, VANETs are prone to the risk of numerous security threats and at-
tacks that make VANETs unable to deliver the services to users. These services
include: providing access to spectrum for communication, providing access to
VANETs’s resources such as database, or reporting data to RSU. Hence, these
attacks have several impacts on the performance and security of VANETs. For
instance, the following are attacks that VANET may face [12]:
– Broadcast Tampering where attackers may send false safety messages. In-
jecting false safety message in VANET may cause an accident by following
fake safety messages.
– Dropping some packets.
– Consuming VANET resources by sending a high volume of messages.
– The eavesdropper vehicle may modify, or reroute some packets.
Motivated by these observations, this paper proposes a new Intrusion De-
tection System (IDS) using Dempster–Shafer theory and Bayesian classifier
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to prevent possible future security attacks in VANET. IDS is a cyber-security
system used to detect malicious node and attacks in any network. For each
event in VANET, our intrusion detection scheme collects evidences from mul-
tiple sources and fuse them to calculate the suspicion level of an event. Firstly,
Dempster–Shafer theory is used to fuse uncertain information from multiple
sources (i.e. evidences) to make an inference about the event. Dempster–Shafer
theory is a mathematical theory proposed by Shafer in [22] to combine the evi-
dences from multiple sources of information for reaching the final decision. The
purpose of an aggregator operator is blending multiple sources of evidences
meaningfully for summarizing and simplifying bulk data to detect intrusion.
The final decision in Dempster–Shafer theory is hypothesis selected from a
given set of hypothesis. In our work, the hypothesis set contains the class for a
new event. Malicious activity is a subset of hypothesis set. Dempster-Shafer’s
framework assigns the belief for each hypothesis assigned based on the basic
probability for each evidence.
In addition to Dempster-Shafer’s framework, our security scheme uses in-
telligent learning system to incorporate prior knowledge and observed data on
anomalous activity to classify each event into normal, or abnormal. Bayesian
classifier possess several properties that enable it to detect intrusion accu-
rately. The classifier assumes the probability of one evidence does not affect
the probability of other. In presence of uncertainty of information, Bayesian
classifier provides a formal and rational way of reasoning. Furthermore, op-
timal decisions can be extracted according to the quantities of interest. The
classifier simulates human thinking and behavior because of its ability to rea-
son and learn. Because of mathematical foundation of the classifier, it has been
adopted in many areas of science and engineering including intrusion detec-
tion problem [8,22,4]. The classifier requires only one scan of training data to
compute the required probabilities and it omits the tuple if it contains miss-
ing data. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first intrusion system that
integrate information fusion and Bayesian learning. The main contributions of
this work can be summarized as follows:
– Clustering mechanism is adapted where a cluster head (RSU) assures that
communication is only achieved between trustworthy nodes.
– A four-phase intrusion detection scheme is proposed and evaluated. We
consider incorporating rule-based filtering system, event-specific trust, and
prior knowledge. A multi- source of evidence cyber-security system has two
distinct advantages over other security schemes especially when used with
a proper fusion algorithm:
– A single source of information may provide faulty, erroneous results,
and there is no way for accurate intrusion detection results. A multi-
source of evidence system provides results with diverse accuracy. Faulty
information can be easily detected with the help of a proper fusion
algorithm and using multiple sources of evidence.
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– Multiple sources of evidence system receive information with wide vari-
ety and characteristics. Thus, it enables creating a more robust security
system with less interference.
– The intrusion detection scheme is a hybrid-based monitoring solution that
uses Dempster-Shafer’s framework for combining the evidences from mul-
tiple sources of information and Bayesian classifier for events classifica-
tion.Yet, researchers neglected exploring sufficiently well how to combine
this information into one comprehensive security system for modeling in-
trusion detection in the domain of VANETs. The main concern of IDS is
handling the imprecise, fuzzy, ambiguous, inconsistent, and even incom-
plete information about nodes. Dempster-Shafer’s framework is adopted
to manage uncertainty in VANET.
The rest of this article is organized as follows. First, related work and
our contributions to the paper are introduced in Section 2. Next, VANET is
presented in Section 3. We describe the proposed security scheme in Section
4. Then, we present some of the performed tests and show the performance of
the VANET under different conditions with our scheme in Section 5. Finally,
the article is concluded in Section 6.
2 BACKGROUND
Nowadays, there is a widespread of VANETs applications over the world. En-
hancing road safety is one of the most important applications of VANETs. In
a vehicular environment, the communication-based automotive applications
span both the vehicular to vehicular communication (V2V) and vehicular to
infrastructure (V2I) communication modes as illustrated in Fig.1 RSU trans-
mits safety messages about road and traffic conditions to drivers. However,
these messages are propagated in open space environments that make secu-
rity issues is the biggest challenging concern. Furthermore, IDS are unable
to detect newly attacks because of the tremendous growth in information
over VANET. Our proposed IDS is a hybrid-based monitoring solution that
uses Dempster-Shafer’s framework for combining the evidences from multiple
sources of information and Bayesian classifier to incorporate prior knowledge
to detect intrusion.
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Fig. 1: Architecture of VANET
2.1 Background on DEMPSTER-SHAFER THEORY for Intrusion
Detection
RSU in our scheme combines evidences from multiple sources to estimate the
likelihood of an intrusion for each event in VANET. The Dempster-Shafer the-
ory is well suited for this problem since it computes suspecting level by fusing
conflicting multiple pieces of evidence. In this section we review the Dempster-
Shafer theory in the context of intrusion detection. An efficient algorithm was
presented in [34] to carry out belief calculation for a given hypothesis. In
[18], new IDS proposed where certain node executes Dempster-Shafer for fus-
ing multiple pieces of evidence. This node collects the information provided
by the nodes in the network and makes the final decision for each event. In
[14], authors proposed new scheme for securing safety messages in VANET.
The main concern of the proposed scheme is maintaining the service between
nodes by preventing DoS attacks in VANET. The scheme uses Kohonen’s
self-organizing map (SOM) [24] classifier for detecting misbehavior node. It
analyzes the behavior of each vehicle. A feature map is generated by SOM
to arrange similar classes. Dempster-Shafer theory was used to find attacker.
Trace file was used as input for the classifier. Multimodal biometrics are in-
tegrated with IDS in [7] to overcome the shortcomings of unimodal biometric
systems. Multimodal biometrics are widely used [15] for authentication where
IDSs are modeled as sensors reporting the security state of the system. In
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order to increase the accuracy of IDS, more than one device are selected to
gather data. The collected date are fused using Dempster-Shafer theory. Secu-
rity posture is used to decide whether or not authentication is required for each
user. Furthermore, biosensors are selected using security posture. In [30], new
trust model was proposed for securing communication in VANET. In order to
verify road information, the model consider data trust instead of entity trust.
It adopts Dempster-Shafer theory for increasing robustness and credibility of
the model. Authors proposed new mechanism for detecting selfish and collu-
sive behaviors in VANET. The mechanism uses Dempster-Shafer evidence to
distinguish selfish nodes.
2.2 Machine learning based IDS for Network Intrusion Detection
Machine learning based IDS is proposed to handle various newly arising at-
tacks. It has been used to extract new patterns of attacks from large databases.
In [3], the authors proposed new IDS that adopted the Bayesian classifier to
detect new intrusion. KDD dataset was used to compute the parameters for
the classifier. The classifier was tested using a large subset of KDD dataset.
The results stressed the ability of the classifier to detect new intrusions with
a high accuracy rate. In [32], support vector machine (SVM) was used to de-
tect false message attacks and message suppression messages. The proposed
scheme consists of the data trust model and vehicle trust model. The data
trust model adopts SVM to classify new messages based on its content and
vehicle attributes. DST was used in the vehicle trust model to aggregate mul-
tiple trust assessment reports about the vehicle for extracting the final trust
level for the node. The results showed that the accuracy of the proposed model
is higher than the neural network model.
A Tow-layer filter was proposed in [33] to detect spurious messages. The
coarse filter performs rapid filtration while fine filtration gives more accurate
results. Each message pass through these filters for detecting a spurious mes-
sage. Several sources of information were used to classify messages. These
sources include: timelines of information, node reputation, and event location.
In order to secure communication in VANET, a fuzzy trust model based on
experience and plausibility was proposed in [26]. In the proposed model, a
series of security checks are executed for intrusion detection. For each event,
the location is checked by fog nodes. The results showed that the fuzzy model
overcomes the uncertainty and imprecision of data. In order to detect false
messages, a new framework was proposed in [19] to model the trustworthi-
ness of nodes. The proposed model incorporates rules, experience, priority,
and majority-based trust. The new algorithm was proposed to combine these
sources of information. A new scheme for maintaining security and privacy
was introduced in [27]. Besides securing data, the proposed scheme aggregates
the collected data from vehicles and excludes the data of malicious node by
obtaining a list of trustworthy nodes from trust authority. The efficiency of
the proposed scheme was demonstrated by simulation.
Title Suppressed Due to Excessive Length 7
A new attack on the VANET application was presented in [16]. The at-
tacker broadcasts the scene aligned traffic safety message which may cause care
accident, or traffic jams. The authors analyzed the reasons why traditional
schemes fail to handle this attack. They proposed a new scheme to resolve this
security threat. The new framework for verifying the truth or falsity of the
safety message in VANET was proposed in [28]. In the proposed framework,
the messages generated in response to another alert (primary alert) are used
to compute the degree of belief for the primary alert. The authors proposed
a Historical Feedback based Misbehavior Detection Algorithm (HFMDA) for
detecting the misbehavior nodes in VANET [13]. In this algorithm, a vehicle
sends an alert message to the RSU which checks the database to verify the
truth or falsity of the message based on the past history of the node. Two pa-
rameters are stored in the history database: event notifications, and true event
notification. One limitation of security schemes is that they are susceptible to
tactical attacks such as self-promoting attacks and bad-mouthing attacks. In
addition to tactical attacks, these schemes may violate location privacy since
each vehicle is assumed to have a unique ID. To handle these drawbacks, the
authors integrated trust management with the pseudonym technique in [29].
The reputation model was used to provide feedback on reputation. For false
alarm detection, information entropy and the majority rule were applied to
the reputation accumulation algorithm.
Recently, researchers began adopting deep learning methods for IDS. Deep
learning has several architectures such as neural network models which in-
clude: Deep Belief Networks (DBN), convolutional neural networks, and re-
current neural networks [17]. In order to achieve highly accurate results in
IDS, these architectures have been applied to IDS. In [17], Restricted Boltz-
mann Machine (RBM) and a deep belief network were used for IDS. In [1],
the authors adopted a deep neural network (DNN) in the proposed scheme
to detect new intrusion. Probability-based feature vectors are used to com-
pute the required parameters for the model. Novel deep learning technique
has been used in [11] for intrusion detection. The proposed classifier adopted
non symmetric deep autoencoder for unsupervised feature learning. New IDS
was proposed in [25] for securing communication in VANET against several at-
tacks such as the denial of service, integrity target, and false alert generation.
The detection scheme relies on a set of rules for classifying the behavior of a
vehicle.Furthermore, the authors proposed a new protocol for computing the
trust level for each vehicle. Statistical techniques were used to detect false mes-
sages in [31]. The proposed IDS takes into account key aspects. These aspects
include: transmission intervals, and vehicle density. Besides using clustering
for IDS, trusted third parties were adopted to enhance security. Several of IDS
have adopted the opinions of other nodes to achieve high detection accuracy.
The main challenge is integrating these opinions. The majority voting mecha-
nism was adopted in [21]. Weighted voting was used in [10]. The weight of each
vote is assigned based on the node’s attributes such as location proximity, and
reputation.
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It is worth indicating that some of the presented methods neglected the
evaluation of the trustworthiness of nodes’ data for IDS, while few have been
assessing the trustworthiness of nodes by analyzing the history of the nodes. It
is well known that every node has a certain traffic pattern behavior, which es-
tablishes an activity profile for it (i.e. packet drop rate, and modification rate).
None of the existing IDSs try to capture these behavioral patterns as rules and
check for any violation in subsequent data transmissions. Fortunately, these
rules are usually static in nature. However, they become useless for IDS when
the node adopts new patterns of behavior that are not yet known to the IDS.
Hence, to achieve the highest detection accuracy, IDS should learn the behav-
ior of malicious nodes dynamically. IDS that fails to learn new patterns of
malicious behavior becomes outdated and it generates a large number of false
alarm. The malicious node can also attempt new types of attacks that should
still get detected by IDS. Therefore, there is a need for developing IDSs which
can integrate multiple evidences including patterns of genuine nodes as well as
that of malicious nodes. In this article, to the best of our knowledge, a hybrid
IDS for VANET that combines both machine learning and Dempster-Shafer
theory is proposed.
More importantly, some of presented schemes consider the evaluation of the
trustworthiness of the data shared among these nodes in VANET. In contrast,
the proposed IDS detects malicious nodes based on reported data. RSU evicts
these nodes form VANET after detecting them. Thus, multiple attacks can be
avoided by focusing on nodes’ data and node’s behavior. In order to improve
the accuracy of IDS, the suspicion level for each node is calculated considering
the behavior of node. Moreover, the proposed IDS makes a decision more
scientifically, dynamically, and adaptively where suspicion level for each node
is calculated and changed with the number of communication transactions.
3 Network Overview
Each road is divided into segments (clusters). Each segment is managed by
RSU. Each smart vehicle is equipped with a single IEEE 802.11b based transceiver.
The spectrum is partitioned into non-overlapping channels (16 channels for
each RSU with 5 MHZ spacing with transmission and power mask restrictions
similar to the ISM band). In order to collect road status information (RSI),
nodes in VANET (i.e., vehicles and RSUs) are equipped with different envi-
ronmental sensors, processing, and wireless communication devices. Vehicles
monitor road status information (i.e. the nearby vehicles) and report it to
RSU. RSU processes data and then disseminates final road status to other
vehicles and RSUs. Safety applications require timely and accurate RSI. jth
node is served by ith RSU if:
Sj,i ≥ H (1)
where Sj,i is the signal power received at i
th RSU from jth node, and H is
the threshold for signal power. Signal power is computed as follows:





where d0 is the close-in reference distance, n is the path loss exponent, and
S0 is the signal power at a distance d0.
Algorithm 1: Road Information Management
Input:
N : total number of nodes in VANET.
Send node attrib(): method to send node’s attributes.
Send MaliciousNode List(): method to send malicious nodes list for trustworthy
nodes.
L̃ :Link status vector.
Collect road data(): method for gathering link data.
SendData(): method to exchange link data.
Merge Data(): method to merge results from vehicles.
Output:
F S: Final link status.
N c: set of trustworthy nodes.
N m: set of malicious nodes.
1 for j=1,..,N do
2 Read node attrib(j)
3 if (IDS(j)! = malicious node()) then
4 Nc = Nc ∪ j
5 end
6 else
7 Nm = Nm ∪ j
8 end
9 end
10 Send MaliciousNode List()
11 for j=1,..,Nc do
12 L. = Gather road data()
13 SendData( L. )
14 end
15 F S = Merge Data()
16 Send final(F S)
Let N = {n1, n2, ..., nc} be the set of nodes on which the trustworthiness
of the nodes’ data is performed. Let P = {P (n1), P (n(2)), . . . , P (nc)} is the
set of profiles for nodes, where P (ni) corresponds to the profile of i
th node.
The profile of a node is a set of attributes containing information like node ID,
event time and location, and time since the last event. Let T jk,ϕ is the suspicion
level for jth event of node k, and ϕ is the time gap from the previous event. In
VANET, RSU runs the proposed security scheme to detect malicious nodes.
RSU excludes malicious nodes from the network by informing trustworthy
nodes to discard any message from malicious nodes. We apply Algorithm 1 for
road information management. For the clear exposition, the primary notations
used throughout the problem description are summarized in Table 1.
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Table 1: List of Relevant Notations
Notations Description
K number of segments for a road
Sj,i the signal power received at i
th RSU from jth node
H threshold for signal power
S0 signal power at distance[d] 0
d0 close-in reference distance
n Path loss exponent
P set of profiles for nodes
P (ni) profile of i
th node
T jk,ϕ suspicion level for j
th of node k, and ϕ is the time gap from the previous event
Pi packets’ modification rate
Mi number of modified packets at i
th node
Ti number of packets sent by i
th node
Di Packet drop rate
Ri number of dropped packets at i
th node
C set of clusters in VANET
At set of attributes for each node
Oi degree of outlierness for i
th node
ε radius for the neighborhood of ith node
MinPts minimum number of points required in the e-neighborhood
Gε(i) neighborhood of ith node
sim(i, j) similarity between ith node and jth node
Ω set of mutually exclusive and exhaustive possibilities
mi(hi) basic probability for hypotheses i
Ei event i
Bj occurrence of a transmission for j
th node
P (Ei | h2) probability of occurrence of event Ei given that it is generated by trustworthy node
W number of well-behaved events
U total number of tuples in the database
λW arrival rate for well-behaved events
λm arrival rate for misbehaving events
µW mean parameter for well-behaved events
σW standard deviation for well-behaved events
µM mean parameter for misbehaving events
σW standard deviation for misbehaving events
TP misbehaving events that were correctly classified
FP Well-behaved events classified as intrusion
TN well behaved events that were classified correctly
FN misbehaving events that were incorrectly classified as well behaved.
FP% percentage of false alarms
FN % ratio of well-behaved cases which is incorrectly classified as misbehaving
A percentage of correct predictions of intrusions compared to all predictions Accuracy
4 Hybrid IDS for city-based smart highways
The proposed security system consists of generic as well as node-specific rules
which detect incorrect information and identify data validity. The system mea-
sures the extent to which the node’s behavior deviates from the normal profile
of the node. Each node in VANET maintains knowledge of normal nodes’ be-
havior in the network. This normal behavior can have rules like an average
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data rate. The scheme assigns the initial suspicion level for each event. The
initial suspicion levels are aggregated to obtain an overall suspicion level by
applying Dempster–Shafer theory. Bayesian learning is used to strengthen or
weaken the suspicion level based on the similarity of an event with bogus or
genuine event history. Four different components are used in the proposed se-
curity scheme. These components include: security-risk filter, Dempster–Shafer
adder, event history database, and Bayesian learner.
4.1 Security-risk filter (SRF)
Each event in VANET is analyzed using node-specific rules to measure the
trustworthiness of the vehicle node. SFR is used to determine whether the
observed event of node deviates from the normal profile. Several rules can be
used in this layer of the security system. We briefly discuss two of the rules in
this section.
4.1.1 Stranger nodes
Each node in VANET should register itself with RSU. The most basic check
performed by RSU is checking whether the node is registered or not. The
node is stranger if it is not registered with any RSU in VANET and it has
never sent/received messages from any RSU. This check does not help us in
identifying malicious nodes with complete certainty since a stranger node could
show a good behavior. The suspicion level for a stranger node should be very
high.
4.1.2 Outlier detection
Outlier is defined as rare event (i.e. dropping high percentage of packets) in
VANET with extremely small probability of occurrence that could result in
extreme measurements. For example, each node in VANET usually sends and
receives similar number of packets. Since a malicious node is likely to deviate
from the node’s profile, its behavior can be detected as exceptions to the
neighbors. In VANET, all events are stored in RSU’s event list. The event list
displays a list of events with a name, description, place, and start/end time.
In order to specify the malicious node, RSU observes the modification and






where Mi is the number of modified packets by i
th node, and Ti is the
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where Ri is the number of dropped packets at i
th node. RSU observes
and records the abnormal nodes in its cluster. Furthermore, it keeps track of
the total amount of incoming and outgoing packets for each node. Nodes are
divided into clusters. Let C = {C1, C2, ..., Cc} is the set of clusters in VANET
and At = {a1, a2, . . . , am} is the set of attributes for each node that used to
generate clusters.
For ith node in VANET, the possible attributes are total amount of in-
coming and outgoing packets, modification packet drop rate, and packet drop
rate. A behavior of ith node is detected as an outlier if it does not belong to
any cluster set. Such an observation gives evidence that the ith node could be
a malicious node.
In our work, DBSCAN (density-based spatial clustering of applications
with noise) algorithm is used to filter out outliers and clustering. DBSCAN
clusters together nodes that are similar to each other according to the same
attributes (i.e. modification and packet drop rate). The behavior of a node is
detected as an outlier if it lies alone in a low-density cluster. We measure the
extent of deviation of node behavior by its degree of outlierness. The degree
of outlierness for ith node is computed as follows [22]:
oi =
{
1− εAi , if |Gε(i))| < MinPts
0, otherwise
(5)
where ε is the radius for the neighborhood of ith node, MinPts is the
minimum number of points required in the e-neighborhood, and Gε(i) is the
neighborhood of ith node which can be defined as follows [22]:
Gε(i) = {j|sim(i, j) ≤ ε} (6)
where sim(i, j) is the similarity between ith node and jth node. Similarity





where Mi,j is the number of matched packets. DBSCAN algorithm re-
quires that each object in a cluster Ci should have at least a minmum number
of neighbors (MinPts). Hence, the density of each cluster should exceed some
threshold. In our work, the values of the parameters MinPts and ε are deter-
mined using the heuristic that proposed in[21]. While large values of ε lead to
less number of clusters, lower values generate more number of clusters. Also,
the value of MinPts determines the number of clusters; higher values of MinPts
lead to less number of clusters. If the value is set too high, some outlying nodes
may not be identified. Furthermore, no cluster will be formed since the MinPts
condition is not met for higher values. However, a lot of clusters will be cre-
ated if both parameters are set too small. Each object in the system is treated
as a separate cluster if the value of MinPts is set to 1. Furthermore, outlier
behavior is identified as a separate cluster. Different attributes can be used
for creating clusters. Usually, security scheme is subject to a large number
Title Suppressed Due to Excessive Length 13
of events in VANET for authorization. However, most of these events being
genuine in terms of security. Security filter is essential for separating out most
of the easily recognizable genuine behaviors from the rest.
4.2 Evidences fusing using Dempster–Shafer adder (DSA)
For each activity of node, DSA computes an overall belief value by fusing all
sources of evidence. For each node, the evidence is associated with multiple
events for misbehavior detection scheme. In our work, DSA is used to com-
bine evidence in security system. Dempster–Shafer theory (DST) is a general
framework based on statistical interference for plausible reasoning. DST is a
mathematical theory of evidence-based on belief functions and reasoning. It
assumes a finite non-empty set Ω which is called the frame of discernment
(FoD). FoD can be defined as follows:
Ω = {H1, H2, H3, ..,Hn} (8)
FoD Ω is a set of mutually exclusive and exhaustive possibilities when
satisfying :
Hi ∩Hj = φ, ∀i, j ∈ {1, ..., n} (9)
For the misbehaving nodes detection problem, FoD Ω consists of three
possible values for any suspected event which is given as:
Ω = {misbehaving,Well − behaved, suspicious(unknown)} (10)
For every behavior of ith node in VANET, the rules contribute their in-
dependent evidence about the behavior of the node. DST fuses all evidence
together using a numerical procedure. It computes an overall belief for the
node’s behavior. For any suspected event, the set Ω consists of two possi-
ble values, namely, misbehaving and well-behaved. Thus, the power set has
three possible elements: hypothesis h1= {misbehaving} implying that the
node is misbehaving one, hypothesis h2 ={well-behaved} implying that the
node is trustworthy, and the universe hypothesis U implying that the event
is suspicious. The evidence provided by n evidential sources are represented
as basic probability assignments m1,m2, . . . ,mn over a common universe U
which combined by means of DST to joint basic probability assignment de-
noted by m1(x) ⊕ m2(y) ⊕ ... ⊕ mn(z). In our work, n basic probabilities
m1(x),m2(y), . . . ,mn(z) are combined as follows:

















z=φm1(x) ∗m2(y) ∗ .... ∗mn(z)
(11)
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We assume that if the node is stranger then there is a high probability
that it is an untrustworthy node and low probability that it is trustworthy.





Clearly, if m1(h1) is set too high, the likelihood that behavior of the node
is classified as misbehaving will go up. However, high values of α may raise the
number of false alarms significantly. Similarly, if β is set high, the number of
suspicious events goes up, which increases the number of misses (misbehaving).











For the intrusion hypothesis ( i.e. h1), the combination of the two evidences
(i.e stranger, and outlier rules) can be expressed as follows:
P (h1) = m1(h1)⊕m2(h1) (14)
Similarly, the genuine hypothesis for the new event can be expressed as
follows:
P (h2) = m1(h2)⊕m2(h2) (15)
All events in the system are registered in the repository component. His-
tory records of both well-behaved and misbehaving events are used to extract
the profile for each node in VANET. This database is used to extract char-
acteristics of the two classes. Each event is represented by a set of attributes
containing information like vehicle ID, the total amount of incoming and out-
going packets, packet drop rate, ID’s of the message, delay time of the message,
speed, and location of sender and receiver. While observing the current be-
havior of a node (i.e. the number of dropped and modified packets), we also
accumulate and analyze past behavior in terms of packet drop and modifi-
cation rate for a node. The transmission data for a node in the database is
required for detecting outliers. The expected behavior of the node is to breach
any of the security principles. This can be achieved by modifying packets or
drop some of them. However, to avoid detection, malicious nodes may drop
or modify a large number of packets at longer time gaps or a small number
of packets at shorter time gaps. Attackers may also carry out the attack at
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longer time gaps. This would be difficult for a security scheme to detect the
attack if the behavior of the attacker resembles the genuine node’s profile in
VANET.
To study the frequency of transmission of ith node, we consider the time
gap between successive transmission. The transmission gap is divided into n
mutually exclusive and exhaustive events – E1, E2, . . . , En.The occurrence of
ith event depends on the time since the last transmission. Let T (Ei) represent
the total amount of time that has elapsed since the occurrence of Ei−1.The
occurrence of the event Ei can be represented as follows:
Ei = True
{
∃(BiΛ(Ti−1 < Ti−1 + T (Ei) ≤ Ti)
}
(16)
where Bj is the occurrence of transmission of j
th node within Ti−1 +T (Ei)
since the last transmission at Ti−1. The tuples in the history database are
divided into two classes: misbehaving, and well-behaved class. The class of
each event is defined as follows:
L(Ei) =
{
well − behaved,Di < ρ, Ri < ω
misbehaving,Di ≥ ρ, Ri ≥ ω
}
(17)
Let P (Ei | h2) is the probability of occurrence of an event Ei given that a
trustworthy node generates it. This probability is computed as follows:




where W is the number of well-behaved events in the database and U is
the total number of tuples in the database. The probability of occurrence of
an event Ei given that the malicious node generates the event is computed as
follows:




where M is the number of misbehaving events in the database. Using Eqs.
(18) and (19), the probability of occurrence of the event Ei is computed as
follows:
P (Ei) = P (Ei | h1)P (h1) + P (Ei | h2)P (h2) (20)
The initial belief m(h1 ) of Eq. (11) is updated by using Bayes rule after
adding new events to the history database.
4.3 Bayesian learner-based Intruder’s Classification
Bayesian learning (BL) is a statistical tool that is used to update the proba-
bility for believe by using new evidences and information. Hence, the believe
is updated whenever new information becomes available. In our work, belief
revision using BL is expressed as follows:
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P (h1 | Ei) =
P (Ei | h1)P (h1)
P (Ei)
(21)
By substituting Eq. (20) in Eq. (21) we get:
P (h1 | Ei) =
P (Ei | h1)P (h1))
P (Ei | h1)P (h1) + P (Ei | h2)P (h2)
(22)
BL updates the suspicion level (Si) of the i
th node for each activity in the
light of the new evidence Ei. Si is the probability that the current behavior is
misbehaving and the node is the untrustworthy. BL is used to find the most
probable hypothesis for the event using the history database. This probabil-




P (h1 | Ei) (23)
The posterior probability for each hypothesis in Ω is calculated using
Bayesian rule and the hypothesis with the highest posterior probability is
accepted. The malicious node detection problem has the following two hy-
potheses: h1 = misbehaving, and h2 = well − behaved. By substituting Eqs.
(11), (18) and (19) in Eq. (21), the posterior probability for a hypothesis h1
is computed as follows:
P (Ei | h1) =
P (Ei | h1)P (h1)
P (Ei | h1)P (h1) + P (Ei | h2)P (h2)
(24)
The posterior probability for hypothesis h2 is computed as follows:
P (Ei | h2) =
P (Ei | h2)P (h2)
P (Ei | h2)P (h2) + P (Ei | h1)P (h1)
(25)
Future actions are decided by a security scheme based on the accepted
hypothesis.
4.4 Securing VANETs Using Proposed IDS
The proposed scheme is presented in algorithm ??1. Firstly, it reads the
event parameters such as event time, node ID, and number of packets as
well as the design parameters such as ε, H, and MinPts. SRF handles each
new event. The basic probability values from SRF are combined using DST
to get the initial belief for each hypothesis. The event is considered to be an
intrusion if P (h1) > P (h2). The event is considered as genuine and is accepted
if P (h1) < P (h2). However, if P (h1) = P (h2) the event is accepted and the
node is treated as suspicious. If the node is stranger, then it inserted into the
suspect node list.
The security scheme waits for the next event generated by each suspected
node. SFR checks all the packets sent by the suspected node. It assigns initial
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Algorithm 2: Intrusion Detection System
Input: MinPts, ϕ, N
1 Assign probability- Strange-rule(m1(h1),m1(h2),m1(U))
2 Assign probability- Outlier-rule(m2(h1),m2(h2),m2(U))
3 Compute (P (h1), P (h2))
4 if ( P (h1) < P (h2) then
5 Accept(event)
6 end
7 else if ( P (h1) > P (h2)) then
8 Reject(event)
9 if (Not-Check node in Black List(Node ID)) then
10 Add Suspect table(Node ID)
11 Read parmeters Next Event(Ei)
12 P (Ei | h2) = WV
13 P (Ei | h1) = MU
14 P (Ei | h1) = (P (Ei|h1)P (h1))(P (Ei|h1)P (h1)+P (Ei|h2)P (h2))
15 P (Ei | h2) = (P (Ei|h2)P (h2))(P (Ei|h2)P (h2)+P (Ei|h1)P (h1))
16 if (P (Ei | h1) < P (Ei | h2)) then
17 Accept(Ei)
18 Delete Node Suspect table(Node ID)
19 end
20 else if (P (Ei | h1) > P (Ei | h2)) then
21 Reject(Ei)
22 Add node in Black List(Node ID)
23 Inform nodes Black List()
24 end
25 else
26 Wait Event(Node ID)




belief to the event. If the event is found to be suspicious, it is inserted in
the suspect table. Each event in VANET is time stamped. For ith suspected
node, SRF determines the event that has occurred outside Ei’s set. Next, it
computesP (Ei | h1), and P (Ei | h2) from the database. Then, the posterior
beliefs P (h1 | Ei), P (h2 | Ei) , Pmax(h1), and Pmax(h1) are computed.
P (h1 | Ei), and P (h2 | Ei) are the updated beliefs about the last event
of the suspected node based on the evidence from the database. The value of
P (h1) is taken as suspicion level in the first round. When the next event occurs,
the new suspicious and posterior beliefs are computed based on parameters
of the event. If P (h1 | Ei) ≤ P (h2 | Ei) then the SFR applies the DSA to
combine evidences ( i.e. P (h1), and P (h1 | Ei)) for getting the final suspicion
level.The current round P (h1) value is stored at the end of each round unless
P (h1 | Ei) < P (h2 | Ei). We apply Algorithm 2 for intrusion detection.
Whenever an event is classified as an intrusion, the corresponding node
and the associated messages are discarded from VANET. RSU informs other
nodes in VANET to discard all packets originated from these nodes.
18Please give a shorter version with: \authorrunning and \titlerunning prior to \maketitle
5 Simulation and results
In this section, simulations are conducted to demonstrate the effectiveness and
usefulness of the proposed security scheme by testing it with large scale data,
where Table 2 lists the used simulation parameters. Due to the unavailability
of real-life benchmark data set that contained the required features for testing
(i.e. packet drop rate, and packets’ modification rate), we developed a simu-
lator to generate synthetic events that represent the behavior of trustworthy
node as well as that of the malicious node.
The simulator was designed to handle various real-life scenarios that would
be normally experienced in VANET. Firstly, any actual events database in
VANET contains events of misbehavior nodes interspersed with genuine events.
Secondly, genuine events are mostly similar to a set of nodes. Thirdly, the gen-
uine events and events of malicious nodes are independent and they have sepa-
rate arrival rates. These practical situations are modeled using a Markov Mod-
ulated Poisson Process (MMPP) and two Gaussian distribution functions. All
events in VANET follow the Poisson arrival rate. The system has two states:
a well-behaved state and a misbehaving state. Assume λW is the arrival rate
for well-behaved events and λm is the arrival rate for the misbehaving state.
Gaussian distribution is used to generate a number of dropped packets and
modified packets for trustworthy nodes. By varying the values of mean (µW )
parameter and the values of standard deviation (σW ) different nodes’ behav-
iors can be generated. For malicious nodes, Gaussian distribution is used to
generate different behavior by changing the mean parameter (µM ) and the
standard deviation (σW ) during the generation of misbehaving events.
Standard metrics are used to analyze the performance of the proposed
security scheme under different system conditions. These metrics include:
– True positives (TP) are the misbehaving events that were correctly classi-
fied [9].
– False positives (FP) are the well-behaved events classified intrusion [9] (also
called false alarms).
– True Negatives (TN) are the well-behaved events that were classified cor-
rectly [9].
– False Negatives (FN) are the misbehaving events that were incorrectly
classified as well-behaved [9].
We examine the performance under different parameter settings.
5.1 Impact of threats on the performance of IDS
For comparison, we choose the IDS (BPNN) proposed in [33]. Since this system
focuses on detecting spurious messages, it is the one closest to the proposed
approach among all the methods presented in Section 2. Furthermore, we also
study the improvement achieved by using Bayesian learning with Dempster’s
rule of combination.
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Table 2: Simulation Parameters
Parameter Value
Number of nodes 200
Number of channels per RSU 40
Number of messages per node Random
Type of interface per node 802.11 b
MAC layer IEEE 802.11 b
Transmission power 0.1 watt
Packet size 512
Max Vehicle Speed 80 km/h
Number of malicious nodes 10,20,30,40, 50
Simulation
Device
Intel i5 Core 2.50GHz
Process cores 2 x 2.50GHz
RAM 6 GB
OS Windows 7 64 bit





















Fig. 2: True positive mean under different values of malicious node’s arrival
rates
In Fig. 2, we show the variation of mean TP under various values of arrival
rates for malicious nodes (i.e., the number of abnormal events tuples in the
database). IDS is the proposed approach in this work and DST denotes the
use of DST only for intrusion detection. It is apparent from Fig. 2 that use
of Bayesian learning improves the performance of our IDS by about 15–25%
points in TP. IDS achieves the highest detection rate because it considers the
node’s behavior and trustworthiness of nodes’ data.
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Fig. 3: False positive rate under different values of malicious node’s arrival
rates
FP% metric is used to measure the performance of IDS in terms of failure
in detecting normal behaviors, in other words, the percentage of false alarm.
FP% is computed as follows [9]:
FP% =
FP
FP + FN + TP + TN
(26)
IDS on the other hand, has lower FP than only DST based approach as shown
in Figure 3. Use of BL, however, brings down the FP to values close to 2.5%
since it uses more evidences, especially the trustworthiness of nodes’ data.
False Negative rate (FN) metric measures the ability of IDS to handle a gen-
uine malicious node. It can be defined as the ratio of well-behaved cases such
as a malicious node, which is incorrectly classified as misbehaving. FN% is
computed as follows [9]:
FN% =
FN
FP + FN + TP + TN
(27)
Figure 4 presents a comparison of the IDS’ FN against DST and BPNN.
It is seen from Fig. 4 that the use of IDS brings down the FN to values close
to 1%.
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Fig. 4: False negative rate under different values of malicious node’s arrival
rates
Accuracy rate A refers to the percentage of correct predictions of intrusions
compared to all predictions. The accuracy rate is computed as follows [9]:
A =
TP + TN
FP + FN + TP + TN
(28)
Accuracy rate is the most important factor for evaluating the performance
of IDS. We have compared the achieved rate of our IDS with other schemes
in Figure 5. The proposed IDS accuracy rate outperforms the other models
since it incorporates Dempster–Shafer theory and Bayesian learning within
the same model, which is not the case in other models.
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Fig. 5: Accuracy rate under different values of malicious node’s arrival rates





























Fig. 6: Throughput under different values of malicious node’s arrival rates
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5.2 Impact of threats on VANET performance
To study the effect of threat on the performance of VANET, we measure
throughput under various values of node’s arrival rates. It is apparent from
Figure 6 that the throughput shifts into the higher level when the number of
malicious nodes decreases to the lowest possible number. The achieved IDS
throughput outperforms the other models since it incorporates more evidence
for intrusion detection. In our scheme, RSU excludes malicious nodes for the
network. Malicious nodes may drop a large number of packets and keep sending
false reports to other nodes. Hence, the number of dropped packets increases
significantly, which lowers throughput. The packet drop ratio is plotted under
various values of arrival rates of malicious nodes as shown in Figure 7. It can
be observed that the drop ratio increases as the number of malicious nodes is
increased. Our scheme excludes malicious nodes in VANET. Thus, the drop
ratio is decreased when an attack is detected and attackers are prevented from
forwarding packets.


























Fig. 7: Drop ratio under different values of malicious nodes arrival rates
6 Conclusion and future work
Although most of the cyber-security systems show good results in detecting
attacks, they are struggling to avoid the modification of safety messages by
malicious nodes in VANET. This assumes significance especially in the do-
main of attacks detection in VANET where a cyber-security system needs to
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minimize the ratio of modified packets but, at the same time, does not wish
the nodes to feel too much restricted in communication. We have proposed a
novel intelligent security scheme based on the integration of three approaches,
namely: rule-based-filtering system, event-specific trust, and prior knowledge.
The main concern of the proposed hybrid IDS is preventing cyber-security
attacks in VANET. A Dempster-Shafer theory is used to calculate the risk of
attacks by combining multiple pieces of evidence, while BL is used to update
the risk level of attacks using the history of database and attacks classifica-
tion model. Comparative studies show the effectiveness of the proposed IDS
through a set of experiments. While combining rules using Dempster–Shafer
theory achieves high accuracy, BL shifts the accuracy to a higher level. Based
on the simulation results, we conclude that the appropriate approach for ad-
dressing detecting intrusions in VANET where the patterns of behavior are
complex is achieved by the fusion of multiple evidences and learning in IDS.
In the near future, we plan to extend the proposed model to utilize big data
collected from real systems. Furthermore, we wish to incorporate the Deep-
learning algorithm within IDS for detecting new attacks. The proposed IDS
can be further improved by combining more conflicting evidences.We wish to
assess the performance of our security scheme on real time system using cyber
threat questionnaire where we can analyze areas of potential or actual vul-
nerabilities. Furthermore, we plan to conduct interview to determine how the
system performs.
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